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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of universal health coverage on cohabitation, marriage, and labor force 
participation. Economic gains from marriage when non-labor income increases among partners. I use the 
expansion of non-contributory health insurance in Mexico to test this. This insurance scheme, called 
Seguro Popular (SP), provides a minimum set of health benefits to the population not covered by formal 
social security. The rollout of SP started in 2002 across municipalities. This variation makes possible 
examine the effect of health insurance on marital status among workers. The analysis of this paper shows 
that non-contributory health insurance coverage has a significant negative effect on the probability of 
marriage among poor and low educated males and females, and a positive effect on the probability of 
cohabitation. SP, however, has no effect on labor force participation.  
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Introduction 
Marital trends of a country have major implications for economic performance. Gary Becker (1973) 
modeled marriage decisions and linked them with aggregated outcomes such as population growth, labor-
force participation of women, income inequality and allocation of leisure. Following Becker (1973), 
scholarship has documented that parents’ stable marital status has a positive effect on the formation of 
human capital of the off springs [Willis (1973, 1980, 1982), Becker (1974, 1976, 1981), Moffitt (1990, 
1995); Schultz (1994)]. Similarly, the formation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills is directly related to 
family factors, particularly marriage [Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008, 2009)]. 
Previous work on cohabitation and its effects arrives at starkly different conclusions in Europe and the 
US. In Europe, Svarer (2002) showed trends in marital status and their increase since 1960’s in Denmark 
and Sweden. As a result of cohabitation, Svarer (2002) argues that failed marriages have decreased. 
Individuals decide to get married after a period of cohabitating. During this stage of a relationship, 
individuals get more information on their partners, so marriage is reached by stable couples. Children 
born from these marriages have good environments for the development of their skills since parents show 
lower rates of divorce. Thus, the European experience is compatible with Friedberg and Stern (2003) 
learning model.  
Research on cohabitation in the US reaches the opposite conclusion. Scholars have found that, unlike 
Europe, in the US cohabitation has increased over time and marriage rates have declined [Bumpass and 
Lu (2000)]. Cohabitants that marry are more tolerant of divorce, therefore average duration of marriage is 
shorter. Axinn and Thornton (1992) use a panel dataset of mothers and their children from the Detroit 
metropolitan area. The data includes children interviewed at age 18 in 1980 and at 23 in 1985. They find 
that that people who cohabit were less committed to marriage are more likely to get a divorce. Similarly, 
Bumpass (1995) and Smith et al. (1996) find that marriages preceded by cohabitation are more likely to 
end in a divorce. 
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Bumpass and Lu (2000) also find a significant increase of cohabitation that includes childbearing. The 
reason behind this increase is the time extension of cohabitation. As time cohabitating extends, the 
probability of pregnancy increases, but the chances for marriage decrease. This instability of marriage has 
a direct effect on the quality of the childcare of the children and the formation of skills. Cunha and 
Heckman (2007; 2008) show the consequences of low quality marriages and parenthood in terms of 
school performance and likelihood of poverty when adult. In sum, cohabitation and marriage have a direct 
effect in the formation of human capital, however the conditions under which the effects are positive 
remain unclear. 
The evidence regarding cohabitation in less developed countries is scant. Heckman et. al. (2010) show 
some evidence for the case of Mexico. They show that cohabitation is increasing, while marriage is 
decreasing. Along these lines, Heckman et. al. (2010) show the increase of the number of new births from 
parents who are cohabitating and the reduction in the number of children living under marriage. The 
prevalence of non-legal unions and cohabitation is higher in rural and semi-urban areas, where the 
population is younger and less educated on average [Quilodrán (2000)]. Other research has found similar 
results to the US experience, where there is a self-selection in cohabitation by those who are more tolerant 
to divorce. Cohabitating couples transit to legal marriages, but the overall duration of the unions is shorter 
[García and Rojas (2002)]. 
What explains these trends in cohabitation? What is the role of social policy on marriage and labor 
outcomes? Evidence on the effect of social and tax policy on the incentives of work and have children 
have being extensively studied in developed countries. Meyer and Rosembaum (1999, 2000) analyze 
AFDC and Food Stamp benefits, Medicaid, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and other federal and state 
income taxes and find an increase in hours worked. Moffit, Raville and Winkler (1995) find significant 
numbers of cohabiters among recipients of AFDC and using survey results find that AFDC rules 
encourage females to cohabit. Moffit (1992) finds that AFDC “provides an obvious incentive to delay 
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marriage, increase rates of marital dissolution, delay remarriage, and have children outside of a marital 
union, all of which will lower the percentage of the population that is married”. London (2008) examines 
determinants of single mothers living arrangements and their effect on mothers AFDC participation. She 
finds that AFDC and Food Stamp increase the propensity of mothers to cohabit, and decrease their 
probability of living with parents or sharing with others, relative to living independently. In the specific 
case of health benefits, Yelowitz (2009) finds that Medicaid's increases the probability of marriage by 10 
percent after controlling for the outflows from marriage due to the independence effect -incentives to 
become divorced-, the estimated effect increases by 10 percent.  
The recent expansion of social protection programs in several developing countries presents new 
opportunities to explore the determinants of cohabitation. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the 
debate on how non-contributory health benefits affect marital decisions of beneficiaries. Mexico 
represents a good case given the size of its population and the fraction of population that is now covered 
by the two pillars of the new non-contributory social protection system, Seguro Popular (SP) and 
Progresa-Oportunidades. Seguro Popular is a health system that provides health benefits to the 
population not covered by social security through a formal insurance scheme. Progresa-Oportunidades is 
conditional cash transfer program (CCT). Both policies were rolled out in different municipalities at 
different times. This variation allows the identification of their effects on marital status and labor 
outcomes with panel data of municipalities. This paper shows for the first SP effects on incentives for 
cohabitation and its effect on labor force participation. 
Using data on Mexican labor force surveys from 1995 to 2009, I analyze the effect the introduction of 
Seguro Popular on the probability of cohabitation, marriage, and labor force participation. The surveys, 
Encuesta Nacional de Empleo (ENE) and Encuesta Nacional de Ocupacion y Empleo (ENOE), have a 
similar structure of the US Current Population Survey. According to Heckman et.al. (2010), Barros 
(2009) and Azuara and Marinescu (2011) SP does significantly affect labor decisions of those included in 
the program, particularly on participation in the informal labor market. This paper shows evidence of how 
5 
	  
universal health coverage has negative and significant effects on the probability of marriage and 
cohabitation. This finding is compatible with standard neoclassical theory, where the hypothesis is that an 
increase in non-labor income reduces individual’s incentives to marry, since the gains from specialization 
are lowered.  
I use different samples for estimating these effects. Among workers with less than nine years of 
schooling, Seguro Popular increases cohabitation by 2 percentage points. Conversely, SP decreases 
marriage in the same proportion. In the case of labor force participation, the results show no evidence of a 
significant effect of Seguro Popular.  
This paper makes two key contributions to the literature. First, it provides comparable evidence to the US 
of the effect of health insurance on cohabitation, marriage and labor force participation. The results 
corroborate the findings in the US of negative impact of health insurance. Murasko (2008) analyzes the 
effect of spousal insurance coverage on married women’s labor supply. He finds that spousal coverage 
has a negative effect on married women’s labor supply. Cebi (2011) find smaller effects after correcting 
for selection and spousal sorting. These findings suggest that universal health provision should decrease 
incentives to marry, since individuals’ gains from staying single could be higher than married. Second, 
this paper contributes to the debate on the impact of the social protection systems created in Mexico 
during the last decade and its effects on the economic outcomes [Levy (2008)]. The analysis on labor 
force participation and its small effect, show that social protection programs have a reduced effect on 
labor market decisions. This finding suggests that Seguro Popular may be welfare improving since it 
protects workers while having a minimal impact on labor supply decisions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II includes a description of the recent trends 
of marriage, cohabitation and labor force participation of females in Mexico. Section III provides a basic 
theoretical model based on Becker (1973). Section IV describes the data, Section V examine the results. 
Section VII concludes.  
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Model 
This section describes a standard neoclassical framework of marriage/ fertility and the expected effects of 
increasing health coverage on the decision to cohabitate and having children. I use the basic family model 
of Becker (1981) and Willis (1973), which describes fertility choice and consumption, not considering 
labor decision. The model first assumes that individuals do the following maximization process.  
),,(max sxqnUU =       (1) 
s.t. cs xxx −=        (2) 
⎟
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⎞
⎜
⎝
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n
t
fq cc ,       (3) 
Households maximize utility that depends on number of children ( )n raised with “quality” ( )q . A 
composite good is represented by ( )x  and can be divided between adult consumption ( )sx  and 
consumption to raise children ( )sx . The function of quality is determined by the time devoted by the wife 
to the children ( )ct  and resources used for this purpose. So females can divide their time at home or at 
work: 
( )wcf ttt +=        (4) 
We are assuming that only females raise children. The labor income of each household can be obtained by 
labor income of the father and the labor income of the mother (time in the labor market times the wage). 
We can add assets of the household to the total labor income of the father in one term (F) and define an 
expression for the full income of the household as 
( ) FttwFwtIncome wcw ++=+=     (6) 
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We can reorganize terms and express the time devoted to raise children in terms of the market wage and 
the price of the consumption good.   
( ) ( ) Iwtxxwtxx ccxsxcwcx =++=++ φφφ     (7) 
The income required to raise children is determined by the resources of the consumption good required 
for doing so, and the time spent by the mother, expressed in labor market prices. Under this definitions we 
can then define a shadow price of children nq as cφ , which describes both costs (mother’s time and 
material) and define the maximization of the household utility as:  
),,(max sxqnUU =       (1) 
s.t. Inqx csx =+φφ       (2’) 
The first order conditions of the maximization can be expressed as follows: 
qcq pnU λφλ ==       (8) 
ncn pqU λφλ ==       (9) 
xxU λφ=       (10) 
This allows us to express the demand for the number children, their quality and the consumption of the 
composite good as follows:  
),,,( Ippq xqn ϕ       (11) 
),,,( Ippn xqn ϕ       (12) 
),,,( Ippx xqns ϕ       (13) 
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According to this standard model, the price of children increases as female wage rate increases. Similarly, 
the demand for children is also increasing of the husband income: as it increases, the demand for children 
also increases –assuming children as normal good-.  
This framework is useful to analyze the effect of free health coverage not linked to labor status on 
demand for children and marriage. As explained in the next section Mexican Seguro Popular (SP) can be 
considered as a non labor income, included in F. Therefore, all other things equal, the inclusion of SP 
should have a positive effect on having children. It also affects the quality of children. As expressed in the 
previous demands, the demand for quality of children is increasing in Income. So, as non labor income 
increases, the demand for both, number and quality, also increase. As explained by Becker (1973), this 
reduces the complementarily of males and females in the production of children over time.  
Following his notation, we have that a necessary condition for marriage is that the maximum output of 
single male and females are strictly lower or equal to their incomes when married. In other words: 
0mmf Zm ≥       (14) 
fmf Zf 0≥       (15) 
Zm0 and Z0f represent maximum output of single males and females, respectively. mmf and fmf represent 
their incomes when married.  So, the increase of non labor income derived from the Seguro Popular 
could change this condition.  
SPZm mmf +≥≤ 0      (14’) 
SPZf fmf +≥≤ 0      (15’) 
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Demographic trends, Cohabitation, Marriage and Labor Force Participation in Mexico.  
Demographic Trends 
Mexico is experiencing three major transitions: demographic, epidemiologic and social. Total population 
significantly increased between 1970 and 2010, going from 48 million to 112 during the period (Figure 
1). This increase was derived from a permanent fall of birth and death rates (Figure 2 and Figure 3), and 
created a population bulge. Population growth has also being accompanied by an accelerated urbanization 
process of the country, mainly from migration from poor regions to medium and large cities (Figure 4).1 
The rapid population growth occurred with a change of the age structure, and it is expected to continue 
during the two decades. There is currently a permanent decrease in the ratio of population not 
economically active. The official projections shows the dependency ration will fall until 2030 as youth 
population also decreases (Figure 5). Today the majority of the population is relatively young, but given 
projected life expectancy, the number of people over 60 years of age will increase in absolute and relative 
terms during a period twenty years. Females are now having lower children (Figures 6 and 7). This will 
change the structure of labor markets and the social security systems, given the relative decrease of 
economically active population with respect to workers in the age of retirement.  
The Mexican population is mainly organized in familiar households. According to the Census 2010, there 
are 112 million people living in 28.2 million households. 98% of the population lives in groups where the 
members have a family tie with the head of the household. Only 2.3% members of households do not 
have familiar tie with the head.  
There composition of the household head has significantly changed during the last 20 years. Households 
headed by a male decreased from 82.7% to 75% during this period (Figure 7). The nuclear household this 
proportion is 83% and 17%, while non-nuclear is 67.6% y 32.4% respectively. The average age of male 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 National Population Council. http://www.conapo.gob.mx 
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head of household is lower than female heads: 67% of total households are headed by a male younger 
than 50 years. Nuclear families are mainly males between 20 and 49 years (55.3%). The non-nuclear 
families the head is older than 40 years (73.3%). Female head of households are between 30 and 49%. 
Households with head of household older than 65, women represent 12.5%. 
Cohabitation and Marriage 
The demographic transition is also reflected in the marital arrangements of the population. During the last 
15 years there has been a sharp increase in the number of people who decide to cohabitate with a partner, 
and a sharp decrease in the marriage. As it is shown in Figure 9, the married population aged between 15 
and 70 decreased from 61 to 51, 64 to 55, and 58 to 48 percent for all the population, males and females, 
respectively. Restricting the analysis to population with less than 30 years, the total reduction in 
percentage points is larger: it goes from 48 to 35, 46 to 34 and 50 to 36 for total, male and female 
populations respectively.   
The increase of cohabitation during the same period is remarkable. As shown in Figure 10, cohabitation 
for the total population almost doubled between 1995 and 2010 going from 6.7 to 11.5 percent. In the 
case of males it increased from 7 to 12 and for females 6.6 to 11 percent. Cohabitation among young 
cohorts is significantly higher. Male population less than 30 years old that declared to cohabitate 
increased from 7 to 14 percent. In the case of female population increased from 8.7 to 15.4 percent.  
The level of cohabitation of young females is significantly higher for younger cohorts, while it 
completely changes for older ones. This has a significant effect on the newborns. More Mexican children 
are born into adverse environments during the last decades (Figure 11). Heckman et.al. (2010) describe 
how the increase in cohabitation has being accompanied by an increase of births out of wedlock in single 
female-headed households. The rate of divorces of for females in reproductive age has doubled during the 
last twenty years (Figure 12 and Figure 13). It is expected that these trends affect the formation of human 
capital of newborns. Cunha and Heckman (2007; 2008) show how family composition has a direct effect 
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on determining outcomes of children. The mechanism is directly related to the wealth and time invested 
by members of the household on parenting that determines of cognitive and non-cognitive skills of 
children. Cunha and Heckman (2009) show how it is not only resources but time and quality of parenting 
have a key role in the formation of human capital.  
Trends of marital status in Mexico could be an indicator of lower quality of parenthood and the 
consequences in the formation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills of new generations. Cunha and 
Heckman (2007; 2009) state that cohabitation can is associated with instability influences for child 
emotional development and maternal stress. This directly related connected to the increase of the relative 
and absolute number of females who are head of household. They generally this group of females work 
longer journeys than males. The permanent reduction of the household size in addition to the increase of 
cohabitation, divorces and single mothers are factors that increase the vulnerability of new generations.  
Young mothers have less disposable hours for parenting, which directly affects the formation of skills. As 
it is shown in   
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Figure 14, between 1995 and 2010, the ratio of hours of work of females to males increased from 48 to 
58. This coincides with the introduction of Seguro Popular in the country. The expansion of social 
protection programs could be a good measure to reduce this vulnerability. However, as stated in the 
previous model, it could reduce the incentives for marriage and consequently could incentivize females to 
cohabitate.  
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Demographic Transition and the Creation of a New Social Protection System  
The demographic and social transitions in Mexico have implicated major challenges for Mexican 
authorities. The two main providers of social security in Mexico Insituto Mexicano del Seguro Social 
(IMSS) and Instituto de Seguridad y Servicios Sociales de los Trabajadores del Estado (ISSSTE) only 
covered half of the population by 2000. This was a result from the evolution of the social security 
implemented in 1943, when IMSS was created. The system was designed with the idea that 
industrialization would expand formal employment and consequently all population would be covered by 
social security. ISSSTE was covered with the same structure but only focused on workers of the public 
sector.  
In 2002 the Mexican federal government introduced a pilot program called “Programa de Salud para 
Todos” known as Seguro Popular de Salud  in order to provide a minimum set of health services to the 
entire population, particularly those individuals not covered by social security. The strategy was designed 
to reduce vulnerability to catastrophic and impoverishing health expenditures of the population not 
covered by IMSS or ISSSTE, thus reducing inequalities of basic health opportunities. The evidence of 
this program was the base to create the System of Social Protection in Health in 2004. 
Popular Health Insurance or Seguro Popular (SP) is voluntary. It subsidizes an explicit set of health 
interventions and it is the mechanism used to reach universal health coverage of the Mexican population 
by 2011. The main requirement to be eligible for the program is not being insured by health institutions 
serving the formal sector (mainly IMSS and ISSSTE), either because one is an informal worker, is self-
employed, or because one is not economically active.  
The provision of the services relies on state governments. The total number of beneficiaries in the system 
and the corresponding funds to the states is defined by both levels of governments. Since 2004, federal 
and state health authorities set affiliation targets in order to reach universal health coverage by the end of 
2011. State health officials define the affiliation process. Seguro Popular has been introduced in all 31 
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states and Distrito Federal. Total expenditure and coverage differ widely among states. Today SP package 
includes 275 medical interventions, which go from routine check-ups to third level surgeries. 
Prior research on the effects of Seguro Popular has mainly focused on its effect on health outcomes and 
expenditures [Barros (2009); Gakidou et al (2006); Galarraga et al (2010); King et al (2009)]. There is a 
current debate on its effect on increasing informality. Santiago Levy (2008) claims a large effect of in the 
increase of informality across the country. However, Campos-Vasquez and Knox (2008) and 
Barros(2009) Heckman, Arias, Azuara, Bernal and Villareal (2010), and Azuara and Marinescu (2011) 
little evidence of this.  
None of these studies have analyzed other economic and social effects of the new health system. This 
paper shows for the first time how the strategy across the country affects the trends on the demographic 
transition, particularly on the marital arrangements. This paper shows the effect of SP cohabitation, 
marriage and labor force participation.  
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Data 
The data of this paper is based on Mexican censuses and labor surveys published by Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica y Geografia (INEGI). Information of Seguro Popular was provided by the Comision Nacional 
de Proteccion Social en Salud (CNPSS), the federal agency that coordinates the affiliation and expansion 
of the program across the country. The geographical unit of information is the municipio, and the 
information on labor is at individual level.  
The Mexican Labor Surveys provide homologated series of information on employment and occupation 
of the national and state population, and its demographic and economic characteristics. The period 1995-
2004 is based on National Employment Survey (ENE) and for the period 2005-2009 is based on National 
Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE). The surveys are taken at household level. Each person 
is interviewed for five consecutive quarters and then replaced by a new representative unit of analysis.2 
This paper only includes the first interview of every individual. This allows valid comparisons across 
time and avoids the attrition problems. Each individual declares their marital status, which has been coded 
the same way all the time. The analysis is based on those who declared being married or cohabitating.  
Additional variables used in the analysis are schooling measured in years of schooling, age, gender and 
the total number of children living in the dwelling. A dummy variable head of household is included to 
characterize those who declare of being so. Finally, I include the variable number of doctors per capita at 
state level. This observable variable is closely related to the provision of the benefits of SP, since this 
system provides the funds to hire more doctors in order to provide the services to the covered population.  
Table 1Table 1 includes the summary statistics of all variables. Note that 50 percent of the population 
declared being married on average during the period of analysis. The average cohabitating is 8%. The 
sample is restricted to population aged between 15 and 70 years, with an average 38 years. 62 percent are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  For	  more	  details	  see	  INEGI	  (2007),	  a	  comprehensive	  description	  of	  the	  surveys.	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active and 60 percent employed. The average years of schooling is 6.2. Finally, the average number of 
children in the households is 2.88. 
Empirical Strategy 
The analysis includes probit models for to determine the effect of the introduction of Seguro Popular on 
marriage, cohabitation and labor force. It also includes OLS estimatons for hours of work. The first set of 
models use two different specifications. 
( ) ihjtihtjhtijhttjjtihjt SHXSPopYprobit εβββφθδα +++++++= 3'2'1'   (25) 
( ) ihjtjjtjtjtjtjtjtihjt ASPSPSPSPSPSPYpr εθδδδδδδα +++++++++= ++−−− 26154233241 (26) 
3
'
2
'
1
' βββφ ihtjhtijhtt SHXA +++=  
The sub-indices are referred to: i for the individuals; h denotes the household; j the municipio and t the 
year of interview. Y denotes any of the three outcomes of interest (cohabitation, marriage and labor force 
participation). δ  is a dummy variable if the municipio where the individual lives has been covered by 
Seguro Popular. jθ denotes a municipio effect; tφ  is the year fixed effect. X denotes individual 
characteristics described in the previous section, including age, gender, years of schooling. H describes 
household characteristics, including the number of children in the household. S denotes the economic 
sectors used by INEGI to characterize the occupation of the subject and ε represents the idiosyncratic 
error term with the standard assumptions (man zero and constant variance). 
Equation (25) show the specification using as dependent variables marriage, cohabitation and labor force 
participation. The parameter of interest δ  and describes if the introduction of SP affected the levels of 
these variables. A caveat of this specification is the presence of trends of the dependent variables. To 
avoid, equation (26) includes the effect four years before and two years after the introduction of the SP, 
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restricting the sample to a balanced panel of municipalities. Tables show the results of these probit 
models. All include municipality fixed effects and report robust standard errors clustered by municipality. 
I include 5 different samples to be compared. These are: (1) All population; (2) only head of households; 
(3) females head of household; (4) population with less than 9 years of schooling; and, (5) females with 
less than 9 years of schooling with children.  
Table 2 shows specification of equation (25) using cohabitation ad dependent variable. Sample 1, all 
population, estimates show that Seguro Popular has a positive and significant effect on cohabitation. 
Column 1, without controls, the introduction of SP show an average increase of 15 percentage points, 
while Column 2, with all controls, show an average effect of 1.7 percentage points. The second sample is 
restricted to heads of household only. The estimation with no controls show a positive effect on 
cohabitation, but once controls are included the effect is zero and no-significant. This does not change 
restricting the sample only to females who are head of household, included columns 5 and 6. When the 
sample is restricted to population with lower levels of education, less than the official obligatory level of 
9 years, the effect is positive and significant. In the case of all, males and females, the effect is 17 
percentage points higher and 2.1 when we include controls. Restricting only females the effect is 27 
percentage points and 1.7 respectively.  
The results suggest less educated workers are more sensitive to the effect of Seguro Popular on their 
marital status. Workers in the lower part of the education distribution are more likely to react to the 
introduction of Seguro Popular because they would provide health benefits members of the household 
without any restriction, like the imposed by social security. The value of health benefits could facilitate 
the decision to start a new household with a different person with no need to be covered in the costly 
formal sector. In general, the wage differential of this population is smaller, so the provision of free health 
services could make marriage less attractive, as stated in the model  
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To see if these effects are driven by trends of marital arrangements, Table 3 examines cohabitation around 
the introduction of Seguro Popular. Specifically, cohabitation levels up to four years before and two years 
after the introduction of the program and we restrict the sample to a balanced panel of municipalities. The 
same controls are included to account for other confounders. Estimations are referred to the relative to the 
year prior to the introduction of Seguro Popular. There is a significant jump in the propensity to 
cohabitate after the introduction of Seguro Popular in the municipio in all cases. Two and three years 
prior to the introduction of the program, the propensity to cohabitate was significantly negative, and there 
is a change in the trend. So the evidence supports a significant impact of the program in the second (year 
1) and third year (year 2) after the introduction is higher than in the first year. The magnitudes for the first 
three samples (columns 1-6) are similar, while for the remaining 2 it is higher. This means that poorer 
workers –with less than 9 years of schooling- are more sensitive to the benefits of SP and are more likely 
to increase their chances of cohabitation.  
The analysis of marriage included in Table 4 is complementary to the analysis of cohabitation. It contains 
the same specification of Table 3 and the same samples. The estimations have the opposite signs to the 
estimations of cohabitation. Periods previous to the introduction are positive and negative after its 
introduction. However, none of the three estimations that include municipio and year fixed effects 
(columns 2, 4 and 6) are significant. On the contrary, the estimation for population with less than nine 
years of schooling the estimations remain significant with the same signs. This reinforces the idea that 
that poor individuals are less likely to marry after the introduction of Seguro Popular. This confirms the 
theoretical hypothesis showed in the model, where individuals who receive a non-labor income would 
reduce their incentives to marry. Poor people covered by Seguro Popular are the ones who would be more 
likely to reach to the benefits provided by the program.  
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Conclusions 
This paper contains an analysis of the impact of the System of Social Protection in Health, called Seguro 
Popular, on cohabitation and marriage. The estimations show that health benefits have a significant and 
positive effect, and negative and significant effect on marriage on cohabitation poor and low educated 
population.  
This suggest that the theoretical hypothesis proposed by the basic model of Becker (1973) of smaller 
difference in wages increase incentives of individuals to remain single, or decide not to get married. The 
required condition to marry (individual earnings as married higher than single) could be violated by those 
at the margin. The coverage of free health services can reduce this conditions for those located in the 
margin - those in the lower part of the wage distribution are more likely to react to this benefit-. In other 
words, the expansion of has an impact on impact on the marriage market of poor and low educated 
workers. The estimations show significant increase in cohabitation among all individuals, with a larger 
magnitude for people with less than nine years of schooling. The size of the impact remains is around 2 
percentage points on average. When the analysis includes the periods before and after the introduction of 
the SP, we find a positive effect of the program on the increase of cohabitation for all workers, and 
negative for marriage of low educated ones. These findings contribute to the literature on the impact of 
health insurance provision on family structure, a literature with similar results for the US. Providing 
health insurance increases the chances of unstable family relations..  
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Figure 1 
Total Population in Mexico. 1950-2010 
 
Figure 2 
Births per 1000 People. 1930-2009 
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Figure 3 
Natural Rate of Population Growth 
 
Figure 4 
Distribution of Urban-Rural Population 
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Figure 5 
Dependency Ratio 
 
Figure 6 
Children per Women 
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Figure 7 
Distribution of Households by Gender of the Head (millions) 
 
 
Figure 8 
Percent of Households Headed by a Female Not Married 
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Figure 9 
Trends of Marriage in Mexico. 1995-2010 
 
 
.  
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
55.0%
60.0%
65.0%
70.0%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Fr
ac
tio
n	  
of
	  To
ta
l	  P
op
ul
at
io
n
Married	  Population	  aged	  between	  15	  and	  70	  
Males Females
Source:	  Author's	  estimation	  using ENE	  and	  ENOE	  	  1995-­‐2010
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
45.0%
50.0%
55.0%
60.0%
65.0%
70.0%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Fr
ac
tio
n	  
of
	  To
ta
l	  P
op
ul
at
io
n
Married	  Population	  aged	  between	  15	  and	  30
Males Females
Source:	  Author's	  estimation	  using ENE	  and	  ENOE	  	  1995-­‐2010
29 
	  
Figure 10 
Trends of Cohabitation in Mexico. 1995-2010 
 
 
  
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Fr
ac
tio
n	  
of
	  To
ta
l	  P
op
ul
at
io
n
Cohabitating	  Population	  aged	  between	  15	  and	  70
Males Females Linear	  (Males) Linear	  (Females)
Source:	  Author's	  estimation	  usingENE	  and	  ENOE	  	  1995-­‐2010
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Fr
ac
tio
n	  
of
	  To
ta
l	  P
op
ul
at
io
n
Cohabitating	  Population	  aged	  between	  15	  and	  30
Males Females Linear	  (Males) Linear	  (Females)
Source:	  Author's	  estimation	  usingENE	  and	  ENOE	  	  1995-­‐2010
30 
	  
Figure 11 
Registered births by Marital Status of the Mother 
 
Figure 12 
Fraction of the Female Population with One or more Divorces 
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Figure 13 
Total Annual Divorces by Duration of Marriage in Years 
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Figure 14 
Convergence of Male –Female Labor Conditions 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Max Min 
Cohabitate 1745542 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Married 1745542 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Employed 1745542 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Active 1745542 0.62 0.48 0 1 
Years of Sch.  1744753 6.23 6.18 0 24 
Age 1745542 34.80 14.10 15 69 
Gender (Male=1) 1745542 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Children in Household 1745542 2.88 3.41 0 44 
Hospitals pc 1745542 0.00013 0.00012 0  0.002  
Economic Sector 
 
  
  Construction 1745542 0.05 0.22 0 1 
  Manufacture 1745542 0.11 0.32 0 1 
     Commerce 1745542 0.13 0.34 0 1 
     Services 1745542 0.27 0.45 0 1 
        Other 1745542 0.03 0.17 0 1 
 
 
